## Definition - The [[Philosophy|philosophical]] position that **[[free will]] and [[Determinism]] can coexist** - Reinterprets freedom as the ability to act according to one’s internal desires, motives, and reasoning—even if those are determined by prior causes - Often framed as a middle path between [[Determinism|Hard Determinism]] and libertarian [[Free Will]] ## Core Concepts - **Freedom as autonomy**: True freedom is acting in accordance with one’s will, not the absence of causation - **Responsibility under [[Determinism]]**: Moral responsibility remains meaningful if actions stem from internal states (values, reasons) - **Conditional ability**: One “could have done otherwise” if one had different desires or reasons, even within a deterministic framework ## Key Characteristics - Shifts the [[free will]] debate from metaphysical independence to [[Psychology|psychological]] agency - Often associated with **soft [[Determinism]]** (Hume) - Supports moral accountability despite causal [[Determinism]] - Rejects [[Fatalism]]; actions still shape future events ## Role in Ethics - Grounds moral responsibility in intentional, rational action - Provides a [[Philosophy|philosophical]] foundation for justice systems, ethics, and personal accountability - Offers a pragmatic way to reconcile scientific [[Determinism]] with human agency ## Notable Thinkers - **David Hume**: Classical compatibilist framing of freedom as acting according to one’s will - **John Stuart Mill**: Extended compatibilism into utilitarian ethics - **Harry Frankfurt**: Introduced hierarchical models of desires (first-order vs. second-order) in evaluating free actions ## Related Concepts - [[Determinism]] - [[Hard Determinism]] - [[Free Will]] - [[Moral Responsibility]] - [[Causality]] ## Notable Quotes - "Freedom is not the absence of causation, but the alignment of one’s actions with one’s will." — Paraphrase of Hume - "A person is free when their actions flow from their own authentic desires." — Paraphrase of Frankfurt